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Abstract
In Kuhnian terms, science education has been a process of inducting students into the
reigning paradigms of science. While it may never have been explicit, the goals of science
education clearly have been to persuade students that science provides a fairly constant, highly
justified, and sufficient understanding of physical phenomena. In 1984, Duschl noted that science
education had not kept pace with developments in the history and philosophy of science. Positivism
was dethroned years ago and it turns out that factors surrounding discovery are at least as important
as the justification of knowledge. Indeed, the entire concept of justification has been drastically
changed.
Capitalizing on these new developments, Duschl, Hamilton, & Grandy (1990) wrote a
compelling argument for the need to have a joint research effort in science education involving the
philosophy and history of science along with cognitive psychology. However, the issue of discovery
compels the research community go one step further. If the science education community has been
guilty of neglecting historical and philosophical issues in science, let it not now be guilty of
ignoring sociological issues in science. A collaborative view ought also to include the sociological
study of cultural milieu in which scientific ideas arise. In other words, an external sociological
perspective on science.
A sociological perspective provides a different view of students. Many students do not
deem induction into a scientific paradigm as a thing desirable. Thus, the presentation of a major
scientific concept such as evolution is rather less like two evolutionary biologists debating the fine
points of evolutionary theory, and rather more like Darwin presenting the Origin of Species to a
public who historically had a very different view of origins. Studies in the sociology of knowledge
have provided insight into the origins of Darwin's ideas and how those ideas came to be accepted in
the scientific community of his day. Shouldn't that same perspective help science educators
understand how science is received and understood by their students? The logic of discovery from a
sociological point of view implies that conceptual change can also be viewed from a sociological
perspective.
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Science education has long been grounded in a philosophy of logical positivism which
minimizes factors that surround discovery while emphasizing the justification of knowledge. In
Kuhnian terms, science education has been a process of inducting students into the reigning
paradigms of science. While it may never have been explicit, the goals of science education clearly
have been to persuade students that science provides a fairly constant, highly justified, and
sufficient understanding of physical phenomena. In 1984, Duschl noted that science education had
not kept pace with developments in the history and philosophy of science. Positivism was
dethroned years ago and it turns out that factors surrounding discovery are at least as important as
the justification of knowledge. Indeed, the entire concept of justification has been drastically
changed, so much so that an article was recently published on the "demise of justification" (Eby,
1991, p. 531).
Capitalizing on these new developments, Duschl, Hamilton, & Grandy (1990) wrote a
compelling argument for the need to have a joint research effort in science education involving the
philosophy and history of science along with cognitive psychology. They point out that cognitive
science represents the nature of an individual's knowledge in terms of schemata and that this is
analogous to frameworks of knowledge justification in the philosophy of science. Furthermore, they
point out the similarity between a cognitive view of learning (i.e., schemata restructuring leading to
conceptual change) and scientific discovery as illuminated by philosophers and historians of science
(i.e., the logic of discovery). Thus, in theory these three areas ought to be mutually illuminating. I
heartily endorse their position, but the historical issue of discovery compels the research community
go one step further. Duschl et al. (1990) rightly argue that science education can benefit by
examining the cognitive concept of conceptual change in the historical and philosophical lights of
discovery and justification. However, what is forgotten is that discovery always takes place in a
social and cultural milieu.
Clearly conceptual change in the science classroom takes place, and models of conceptual
change (e.g., Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982) have helped educators understand and
improve learning. The problem is that current thinking about conceptual change is excessively
rationalistic and thus limited. In this paper I argue that current thinking needs to be counterbalanced
by contextual constructivist ideas (Cobern, in press). As an example of using contextual ideas, I
will draw from the social study of science.
The Social Study of Science Education
An external sociological perspective on scientific discovery involves the sociological study
of cultural milieu in which scientific ideas arise. If the science education research community has
found it helpful to draw upon the history and philosophy of science, I think they will also find it
helpful to draw upon the study of cultural issues in the development of science. Without ignoring
the achievements of conceptual change research, one can suggest that a cultural perspective1 on
science learning offers additional insight. For example, it may be found that many students resist
scientific ideas for reasons similar to those that led many 16th century geocentrists to resist
heliocentrism. Bare in mind that one scientist trying to convince a colleague, or even a scientist
from another field, is not the same as trying to convince those outside the scientific community. Nor
is teaching evolution at the secondary level, for example, anything like a biology professor and
graduate students discussing the fine points of evolutionary theory. To the contrary, it is very much
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like Darwin presenting the Origin of Species to a public who historically held a very different view
of origins. For the biologist and graduate student the fundamental questions of Darwin's day have
long been satisfactorily answered, but not so for the public outside the scientific community
including the young science student. It is thus appropriate for the science education researcher to
ask about the culture of science classrooms and curricular science vis-a-vis the cultures from which
students come. It is appropriate to ask about the questions that students deem essential and what
those questions mean for science learning.
For some time now, I have been concerned that science education assumes too much about
students. I have in mind world view, the "culturally-dependent, implicit, fundamental organization
of the mind... composed of presuppositions or assumptions which predispose on to feel, think, and
act in predictable patterns" (Cobern, 1991, p. 19). At a minimum science education appears to
assume that students share with scientists particular worldview presuppositions about what the
world is like, what questions are important, and what methods ought to be used in pursuing
answers. Presumably, these shared presuppositions are forged in elementary school. We forget,
however, that students live in multiple worlds: the worlds of family, community, peers, and school
(Phelan, Davidson, & Cao, 1991). These worlds with their different orientations interact, yet school
rarely acts to help students deal with the interactions. As noted by Linn & Songer (1991), students
tend to compartmentalize knowledge. The result is that they simply do not deal with the interactions
among their worlds, leaving their education permanently impaired. Education for the majority needs
to be broadly construed to incorporate students' several worlds, thus facilitating the integration of
knowledge.
My point is that while science education researchers are beginning to see that the initial
constructivist views of learning were excessively rationalist, the overall view of science learning as
conceptual change is still too narrowly conceived (Strike & Posner, in press). The social study of
science education is a young field, but it is here that one finds interesting examples of research on
broader views of learning (Bloom, 1991; Cobern, 1991; Gauld, 1989; Kawasaki, 1990; Millar,
1989; Ogawa, 1989; Solomon, 1989). Another field of interest is Atwater's (1991) multicultural
approach to science education. Her focus is more on interpersonal relationship and learning styles
as cultural factors than on cognition. Obviously, there are many factors of culture. However, I agree
with Ogawa (1991), "the American approach to multicultural science education is problematic. It
seems to me that the movement encourages 'universal science for all Americans' without ever
considering the possibility of multi-sciences," where multi-science refers to science in various
contextualizations. The approach from the social construction of knowledge recognizes that science
does not exist disembodied any more than do students. The collaborative effort that joins the history
and philosophy of science with cognitive studies is welcomed because of it recognizes the need for
a broader approach to science learning - but, it does not yet go far enough.
Conceptual Change
Models of conceptual change are based on the critical elements of prior knowledge and
conceptual conflict. As noted by Garrison & Bentley (1990, p. 21), "students' prior, reasonable and
highly verified concepts of natural phenomena provide the prior knowledge base for all subsequent
learning about such phenomena." When new knowledge and prior knowledge are similar, the
student is able to interpret the new knowledge in a way expected by the teacher. The student's
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knowledge grows smoothly. In Piagetian terms, this is assimilation. It is weak restructuring in
cognitive terms. However, when new knowledge and prior knowledge are quite dissimilar, as is
typically the case between commonsense science and formal science, conceptual conflict occurs.
About conceptual conflict there is no doubt, prior knowledge is tenacious and poses a
formidable challenge to instruction. The successful interpretation of new knowledge, as per the
teacher's intentions, requires accommodating the new knowledge within the prior framework, or in
cognitive terms, the radical restructuring of prior knowledge. Models of conceptual change applied
to teaching suggest that instruction must accomplish three things for conceptual change to occur.
Instruction must enable a student to see that science conceptions are more intelligible, plausible,
and fruitful than his or her own priorly held conceptions. What confounds the science teacher is not
that some students fail to learn, but that students either remain unconvinced (Lawson & Weser,
1990; Lawson & Worsnop, 1992). Or, they have interpreted a new concept in a fashion unintended
by the teacher (Osborne, Bell, & Gilbert, 1983). Even graduate level science students have been
shown to hold concepts that vary considerably from what is considered scientific orthodoxy
(Clement, 1982). As far back as 1978, Hawkins observed that,
reasonably patient explanation is no cure... we are up against something rather deep in the
relation between science and common sense; we are up against a barrier to teaching in the
didactic mode which has hardly been recognized, or if recognized has been seen mainly as a
challenge to ingenuity in teaching rather that as a challenge to a deeper understanding of
human learning. (1978, pp. 5 & 7; emphases added)
What is the barrier? Here we are well advised to listen to the radical constructivists' insistence that
learning means interpretation (Wheatley, 1989). Learning is not like photography, but like
impressionistic artistry. As Ausubel says, the only real learning is meaningful learning. We have
learned something when it makes sense to us. If learning occurred by transmission, students would
either have the concept or not. What they would not have are idiosyncratic versions of the concept.
Surely an inability to make sense of a concept within the context of one's own background
is at least one type of barrier. However, by holding to an exclusively rational perspective on
conceptual change, science educators fail to appreciate the role of interpretation and personal
meaningfulness. Moreover, the rationalism is exclusive. It is scientific rationalism and nothing else.
Excessive scientific rationalism fails to understand that students have different ideas "precisely
because the pursuit of scientific knowledge is not the only or even the most important goal [student
ideas] subserve" (Hills & McAndrews, 1987, p. 216). Again, insofar as they go models of
conceptual change have been helpful (e.g., Clement, 1987). Now, let research push conceptual
change into a broader arena.
Internalization vs. Conceptual Change
The science educator is caught on the horns of a dilemma. Those who have acquired a
scientific viewpoint find it much easier to understand new scientific concepts because such
concepts make sense in light of the person's scientific viewpoint. However, those most in need of
learning scientific concepts often lack the very scientific viewpoint that makes scientific concepts
meaningful. Of course, as some teachers do, one can always drill students on concepts until they are
6
memorized even without a scientific viewpoint. However, in documents such as the AAAS (1989)
Science for All Americans it is evident that educators consider scientific literacy to be much more
than the simple acquisition of a minimum number of scientific concepts. Why?
To formulate an answer I want to follow Garrison & Bentley's (1990) example and
paraphrase Wittgenstein's (1958) argument against the possibility of anyone ever developing a
purely personal language. I begin with the question, what does it mean to understand science?
Answer:
P1: I can only claim to understand a concept of science when I understand those prior
concepts that justify the first concept. In turn, I can only claim to understand the
prior concepts when I understand their justification.
Unfortunately, this proposition results in an infinite regress, and as C. S. Lewis (1947, p. 91) so
elegantly wrote, "it is simply no use trying to see through first principles... If you see through
everything, then everything is transparent. But a wholly transparent world is an invisible world. To
see through all things is the same as not to see." An infinite regression is the same as "not to see,"
thus, following the lead of both Lewis and Wittgenstein:
P2: Science is more than a system of concepts. Science is a set of first principals or
presuppositions culturally determined.
P3: These presuppositions determine what scientific concepts will be like, and there is
nothing prior to those presuppositions.
P4: Therefore, an understanding of science is not achieved by acquiring knowledge of a
hierarchical set of concepts, but by acquiring the presuppositions that support the
hierarchy.
Understanding is made possible by a foundational set of presuppositions - but, these are culturally
determined. Thus, science itself is fundamentally an issue of culture. It requires learning to see the
world in a new and very different way.
This discussion serves to further clarify the science teacher's dilemma. To break out of the
dilemma, Garrison & Bentley (1990) use Kuhn's (1970) explanation of how a scientist becomes a
member of a new paradigm. They argue that one cannot learn a new vision, but that one internalizes
exemplars of the new way of seeing. For example, motion on an air track can serve as an exemplar
in physics, but not as a device for explaining a concept. It is an exemplar to the extent that it helps
students visualize motion as Newton visualized it. Internalization of the exemplar is the result of
persuasion. Here Garrison & Bentley (1990, p. 30) offer an amusing quote from Wittgenstein on
reasoning with someone who has a fundamentally different way of seeing things, "I said I would
'combat' the other man - but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly, and how far do they go? At the
end of reasons comes persuasion."
Why persuasion? Because, the acquisition of a scientific viewpoint is not at heart an
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epistemological issue, nor is it a simple matter of rational conceptual change. Models of conceptual
change are epistemological models that assume a common starting point, or reference point.
Garrison & Bentley (1990) correctly observed that the acquisition of a fundamental viewpoint is an
issue of persuasion and internalization, rather than instruction and learning due to the lack of
sufficient common ground. In my view, however, Garrison & Bentley (1990) expect too much of
exemplars. Exemplars are derived from a culture to represent the same culture. They do not bridge
cultures. On the other hand, a metaphor is a language device that presents an exemplar in the
language of a different culture precisely for the purpose of bridging the two cultures. There is a
classic example in cosmology. Many people find it difficult to visualize the universe expanding in
all directions but with no center of expansion. Arthur Eddington suggested a metaphor, the
expanding universe is like an expanding balloon. "Pretend that space is two-dimensional and that
the stars and galaxies are dots on the surface of an expanding balloon. From the point of view of
any one dot, the other dots are moving away from it in all directions, yet no dot is the center"
(Lightman, 1989, p. 97). This metaphor is remarkably effective because it uses an ordinary, well
known object from one culture to demonstrate a very different way of seeing. A point I wish to
emphasize is that Eddington was able to create this metaphor because he was conversant with two
cultures. Garrison & Bentley (1990) speak of science as a second culture, but they fail to see that
cultures can be bridged. To use Hills' (1989) colorful phrasing, they have not moved from science
education as a matter of "domestic affairs" to one of "foreign affairs."
It is not surprising that science education researchers fail to see science education in terms
of foreign affairs. The philosophers and historians of science most influential among science
educators are philosophers and historians of domestic affairs. For example, Kuhn (1970)
acknowledged that science is influenced by factors beyond the community of scientists, but he does
not expand upon this influence. Kuhn's,
scientists are not represented as being influenced by the general conceptions of nature, man,
God, society, and history that inform the thought of their age, or as ideologically involved in
social or political issues. His scientists confront nature and other scientists. (Greene, 1981,
p. 5)
Once science is viewed in cultural terms as exemplified by Greene's work on Darwin, conceiving of
science education as a matter of foreign affairs becomes quite natural. One begins to understand
why metaphors can communicate what exemplars alone cannot. This is a rich field for research,
however, a thorough discussion of metaphor is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I wish to
continue with a particular metaphor, foreign affairs.
Two Epistemological Foundations: Creationism2 and Positivistic3 Naturalism
A typical biology textbook begins its coverage of evolution with Darwin and his
masterpiece, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. The chapter may include a
few historical references, but a typical chapter on evolution will focus on Darwin's observations
during his voyage aboard the Beagle and the supporting concepts of "struggle for survival" and
"natural selection." The discussion then moves on to evidences for evolution - all in good logic of
justification fashion. In the late fifties and early sixties, some scientists and educators grew
concerned about the widespread lack of acceptance of evolution by the public. The battle was
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joined, "A hundred years without Darwin is enough!" The Biological Sciences Curriculum Study
(BSCS) sought not only to increase the amount of evolution taught in high school biology. BSCS
sought also to infuse the biology curriculum with evolutionary concepts following Dobzhansky's
(1973) dictum "nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution." The years since
have seen the amount of evolution in science curricula go up, then down, and now appears to be on
the way back up.4 On the other hand, the public's attitude toward evolution appears to have
remained rather constant.
Regardless the concern that some express over the public's understanding of evolution, one
cannot deny that evolutionary theory has had a profound impact on Western thought. We are not the
Europeans and Americans of 1859. However, neither are we all evolutionary biologists, let alone
scientists in general. Darwin was not then, and is not now, the only influence on Western thought.
Though evolutionary theory is not resisted in 1992 the way it was in 1859, we are still interested in
many of the same fundamental questions. For example:
1. What is the essence of Nature?
2. How do we account for the fact of life rather than no life at all?
3. What does it mean to be a human being?
4. In what sense, and to what extent, are human beings different from other living
things?
5. What is society?
The relationship between evolutionary and religious thought has often been stormy. In the wake of
creation science challenges to the science curricula of public schools, educators have tried to
persuade the public that evolutionary and religious thought are distinct entities that need to be kept
separated (e.g., California, 1990).5 To the contrary, I do not believe that evolution can be taught
effectively by ignoring significant metaphysical questions. One addresses these issues not by
teaching a doctrine, but by looking back historically to the cultural and intellectual milieu of
Darwin's day and the great questions over which people struggled.
The Thirty-Year War ended in October 1648, with the signing of the Peace Treaty of
Westphalia. "The supremacy of Christian theology in European life was over. The age of Faith, the
Middle Ages, had run its course" (Jaki, 1983, p. 11). For centuries, the fundamental questions of
life had been answered by a Christian worldview, which presented a unified view of knowledge and
belief grounded in a theology of creation. The cosmology of the Christian worldview was based on
the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of Scripture, which taught that Nature was the purposeful
creation of God. Moreover, people drew from this the inference that Nature was essentially static.
The Christian worldview had a linear sense of time that had both a beginning and an end. The
Biblically based sense of linear time, however, did not necessarily involve the view that the state of
human existence was ever progressing (Greene, 1981). The notion of "progress" though based on a
linear concept of time was to come much later, and indeed was a notion critical in the development
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of evolutionary theory.
For the purposes of this paper, even a brief account of the intellectual and cultural history of
the Renaissance and Reformation is not really needed. Suffice it to say, the religious wars that
followed the Reformation dealt a crippling blow to the certainty that the Church and Christian
worldview held for people throughout the Middle Ages - a certainty that was already in a much
weakened condition (Cobern, 1992). The 1648 Peace Treaty of Westphalia ended the religious
warring, and it also marked the end of the decline into uncertainty. The Christian worldview had
long been without significant challengers until the skepticism and uncertainty of the 17th century
gave birth to positivistic naturalism. In this view, certainty of knowledge could be attained with an
empiricism restricted to measurable characteristics and secondary (or natural) causes. In the words
of E. A. Burtt:
The world that people thought themselves living in - a world rich with colour and sound,
redolent with fragrance, filled with gladness, love and beauty, speaking everywhere of
purposive harmony and creative ideals - was crowded now into minute corners of the brains
of scattered organic beings. The really important world was a world hard, cold, colourless,
silent, and dead; a world of quantity, a world of mathematically computable motions in
mechanical regularity. (1967, p. 238-239)
For those who chose it, positivistic naturalism re-established certainty of knowledge, but one had to
accept a diminished view of both religious and humanistic concepts. With the philosophy of
Descartes, one sees the beginning of a mortal epistemological struggle between creationism and
positivistic naturalism. Early positivists like Descartes were clearly still thinking within a Christian
framework. Even Darwin himself as late as 1860, showed the influence of Christian thinking:
I had no intention to write atheistically. But I own that I cannot see as plainly as others do,
and as I should wish to do, evidence of design and beneficence on all sides of us. There
seems to me too much misery in the world... On the other hand, I cannot anyhow be
contented to view this wonderful universe, and especially the nature of man, and to
conclude that everything is the result of brute force. I am inclined to look at everything as
resulting from designed laws, with details, whether good or bad, left to the working out of
what we may call chance. (quoted in F. Darwin, 1888, vol 2, pp. 311-312)
With the Descent of Man, all had changed.
Since Kuhn (1970), the philosophers of science have been saying that theories of science are
always underdetermined, and so it was with evolution. It was not enough for Darwin to make the
observations he did. For example, there had long been explanations for fossils within the creationist
perspective. Without compromising the genius of Darwin, one has to recognize the influence of the
intellectual and cultural state of affairs during his lifetime. The West was still dominated by
Christian thought. Positivists shared important elements of creationist epistemology such as the
requirements of evidence and experimentation, the canons of proof. The West, however, was no
longer a Christian civilization. Darwin was born into an age of transition where long held ideas had
been weakened. Of particular significance to Darwin were presuppositions concerning Nature.
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Newton argued that a static Nature was composed of particulate matter in motion. To others, that
was more a description of a changeable Nature than a static one. Herschel demonstrated that the
stars were not fixed after all, but moved. By the 1800s, the accepted assumption of a static Nature
was not nearly as tenable, as self-evident, as it had been.
By the 1800s, the West had witnessed remarkable scientific progress in providing a
mechanistic understanding of natural phenomena. Moreover, Darwin's day was a time of
unprecedented economic expansion, a time when laissez fair capitalism was the rule of the day.
Competition was the ethic of the capitalistic marketplace that provided all the change and progress.
In 1850, Joseph Paxton built the Crystal Palace in London to showcase the scientific and
technological achievements of modern Europe. This was indeed an age of change and progress, and
this was the backdrop for Darwin's accomplishment. Could these ideas of mechanicism,
competition, change, and progress be applied to the world of organic life? If only there were a
mechanism...
I am not saying that these were the literal thoughts that led Darwin to the concept of natural
selection or that he even had such thoughts. However, he was not a hermit. This was the
environment in which he thought and reasoned. Though what I have written is the barest of
descriptions for this rich piece of intellectual and cultural history, it is sufficient to make the point
that one can describe Darwin's theories as science, but not his embrace of positivistic naturalism.
Yet the first makes no sense without the second. To come again to the classroom, understanding
evolution requires no less now then it did for Darwin. To understand evolution one must be able to
see the world as it is seen by positivistic naturalists - the worldview of evolutionary biologists and
of many scientists in general. That is not, however, the worldview of many students. Thus, my
position is that the teaching of evolution needs to begin with the very metaphysical questions that
were so troublesome in Darwin's day: what is the essence of Nature, what is life, what is a human
being? How do religion, philosophy, and science inform our view of the world? These questions are
not amenable to simple, didactic teaching. One struggles with these questions, and a teacher who
desires to help students must first have an understanding of student views. That is the only way a
teacher is able to explain a new way of seeing the world to students accustomed to a very different
way of seeing. This returns us to the concept of metaphor and the bridging of cultures. For example,
the "two books" metaphor (the book of Scripture and the book of Nature) has long been a powerful
device for helping religious students understand the relationship between science and religion (Van
Till, 1990). Finally, there is the issue of persuasion. Returning once more to Wittgenstein, "I said I
would 'combat' the other man - but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly, and how far do they go?
At the end of reasons comes persuasion" (quoted in Garrison & Bentley, 1990, p. 30).
Science Education as a Foreign Affair
Studying the cultural history of Darwin's day prepares one to take a contextual or cultural
constructivist approach to the teaching of evolution - the foreign affairs approach. Evolution is a
good example for a discussion on foreign affairs because it is so widely rejected and misunderstood
by the public. It is also very clear that evolution involves a non-commonsense way of looking at
nature and human beings. Also, more is known about Darwin and the intellectual and cultural
history surrounding the concept of evolution. However, one can imagine the chemistry teacher
saying, "Yes, but my next lesson is on oxidation-reduction equations, so what can this discussion
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possibly mean for me?" I do not think it means very much if one insists on conceiving of science
education as a topic to topic affair. Instead, if one thinks of chemistry in terms of the big ideas that
have changed our view of reality, then the discussion means a great deal. In fact, the discussion
suggests that attacking a small concept in terms of a superordinant conceptual framework, is a good
strategy. One might then adopt the Duschl et al. (1990, p. 234) suggestion concerning the context of
discovery:
A suggestion would be to use the context of justification whenever the development was
within normal science and the context of discovery whenever it was revolutionary science.
Another suggestion would be to use the context of justification whenever new theory
requires only weak restructuring on the part of the student, and the context of discovery
when it requires radical restructuring. Perhaps these two suggestions converge, and any
historical revolutionary episode corresponds to a radical restructuring on the part of the
student, but this remains to be demonstrated.
I share the suspicion that there exists a correspondence between historical revolutionary episodes
and conceptual change by radical restructuring, though it has yet to be demonstrated. I am
suggesting first that historical revolutionary episodes can provide an effective device for organizing
science curricula. Second, I am suggesting that the history of science alone does not provide an
adequate description of such episodes, but that one must in addition look to intellectual and cultural
history. In this regard, I am persuaded that one of the best things that could happen in pre-college
science education is the elimination of the strict separation of the natural sciences from the social
sciences and the humanities - but that is a subject for another paper. Third, one must not fail to take
into account the multiple worlds of students and what those worlds mean for how a student sees the
world vis-a-vis what the science teacher is trying to teach. This is a contextual constructivist
approach to science teaching. It means one should not ignore the cultural context on which a
student interprets new knowledge. It means that the social study of science will be at least as helpful
to science educators as are the history and philosophy of science. It means that science teachers will
have to deal frankly with issues they have long preferred to avoid.
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ENDNOTES
1. My use of the term culture is in reference to "webs of significance" (Geertz, 1973, p. 5)
which enable one to make sense of the world. I agree with Outram (1990, pp. 327-328), "Even the
assumption that culture is relatively coherent is under debate. Contemporary critical theory has now
posed a major alternative view: culture as multiple discourses that may occasionally come together
in large systemic configurations, but that more often exist together within dynamic fields of
interaction and conflict.
2. In today's climate, the term creationism has acquired an incendiary quality. That is
unfortunate because the term has a rich history that does not deserve the derision precipitated by its
modern relative, creation science. As I have argued elsewhere (Cobern, 1992), creation science is
more of a product of the 19th century intellectual tumult caused by two competing views of nature.
I use creationism in its historic sense: the earth and its inhabitants are the intentional, purposeful
creation of God. This is a superordinant, metaphysical concept which has significant implications
for epistemology and science (e.g., Foster, 1934). Creation science, however, is an ill-advised
attempt to make creationism a concept within science.
2. Following the example of Gillispie (1979), positivism is not used here in the restricted sense
of the philosophy formally known as logical empiricism or logical positivism.
3. The ups and down of evolution can be seen in the California science curriculum changes
over the last several years.
4. If evolutionary and religious thought have no relationship, one has to wonder what would
ever possess an eminent evolutionist such as Gaylord Simpson to write a book titled, This View of
Life: The World of an Evolutionist?
